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LINCOLN, THE LAWYER
A Prince there was, an uncrowned king, of the House
of Jessie. In those days God sent forth a kinghunter that
he might find a leader for his chosen people. And Samuel
journeyed afar till he came to the village of Bethlehem, of
Judea, to the home of a humble shepherd. "Have you any
sons?" he asked. The aged father answered "Yes". One
by one they came until seven stalwart men in the full
strength of their youth had passed before him who would
find a king. But none would do. "Have you any more
sons?" He asked, "Yes, the youngest, the baby boy, but he
is out on the hills, tending the flocks." "Send and fetch
him." Soon the ruddy faced youth was brought. And the
Lord said "Arise, anoint him, for this is he.' And David,
the humble shepherd boy, was anointed leader of God's
chosen people.
A Prince there was, an uncrowned king, of the House
of Lincoln. In those days God sent forth a kinghunter
that he might find a leader for his highly favored people.
Once again seven stalwart sons of Columbia were brought
forth for inspection. There was the "Sage of Auburn," once
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governor, twice senator of the Empire State, Wm. H. Seward.
There was Simon Cameron, of the Keystone. There was
the "Pride of Ohio," Salmon P. Chase. There was Breckenridge, of the Blue Grass. There was the "Little Giant of
the Prairies " Stephen A. Douglass. There was the favorite
son from the banks of the Father of Waters, Edmond Bates.
But none would do. "Have you any more sons? asked the
Kinghunter. "Only one more, but he is the most unpromising of them all." "But first we mist retrace our steps back
to the prairies." And when this last one was brought before him who would find a king, God said "Arise, annoint
him, for this is he." And Abraham, of the lowly House of
Lincoln, was anointed leader of this highly favored people.
So, we make no apology for writing of this character,
of whom there have been more books written and more
words spoken than of any other mere man in the history of
the world. We make no apology for bringing this added
message of one of the greatest, one of the longest, and one
of the homliest creatures that ever trod this earth. Of his
greatness President Garfield says that no greater has been
amongst men since Jesus Christ. President Harding says
that he is the greatest since Calvary. Ex Secretary of
state, John Hay, says that he is the greatest since Julius Caesar. May we venture the assertion that he is the greatest
in six thousand years? As to his length, he stood eight feet
four inches, without shoes, two feet, of course, being turned
at a right angle at the bottom. So long was he that while
riding the circuit as a lawyer, the beds at the hotels were
all too short, and when straightened out there would invariably be two feet of him protruding over the foot of the bed.
Of his homliness, he was always painfully conscious. He
himself says that while going over a lonely mountain, he
once met an ugly hunter, and when this -hunter saw him he
leveled his gun and took deliberate aim. "Hold on there
stranger" said Lincoln. "What are you going to do?" "I
took a solemn oath on the grave of my mother, that if I elver
met a man homlier than I am, I would shoot him." "Well

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

stranger." said Lincoln, "If I am homlier than you are, I
reckon you'd better shoot".
Whence cometh this strange being, clothed about with
so much of mysticism? It has been said that he came
floating down the Sangamon river in a skiff like a piece of
driftwood, coming from nowhere and going nowhere. But
that is a mistake. The Almighty raised this man up and
he came from some-where and he was going somewhere.
To but few has it ever occurred why God kept this great
Western World looked up for so many ages while the old
world was teeming and congested with so many millions of
humanity? "He had a purpose in that, and that purpose
entered into his "Plan of the Ages." In a very early period
in human history the nations and tribes of men conceived
the idea, and voluntarily or otherwise took to themselves
'Kings and Emperors. His own chosen people, wishing to
ape the heathen nations round about asked God to give them
a king also. This he declined to do, but they insisted and to
humor them He gave them a king and it repented God ever
afterwards that He gave Israel a king. He saw how kings
and their satilites and paristes had usurped power, became
tyrants, appropriated the lands, and were clothed and fed at
the expense of the unrequited toil of common humanity.
God saw all this crime, injustice, cruelty, tyranny, and oppression and said: "I will keep the last, best part of this
planet locked up till my people, the common man, shall develop strength and courage, and leaders capable of leading
them out of this, their Egyptian thrauldom." And that door
was kept locked until two certain Houses came into being.
And those were the Houses of Washington and Lincoln. So
in October, 1492, the clock struck the hour, God inserted the
key, turned the lock, pushed open the door, and said to his
oppressed of all lands, "there is a home, go in and possess it."
And because Washington, the father, and Lincoln, the Savior
of their country were not disobedient to the heavenly vision,
all of us, today, enjoy and possess this last, best gift of God
to Man, America. This Western Hemisphere was God's re-
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serves, held for a peculiar people, for a peculiar destinyself goverment.
So, to this House of Lincoln we trace back this matchless character through the forests of Spencer county, Indiana, across the Ohio, through the floorless, doorless, log cabin
in the midst of slavery in Kentucky, through the Shenendoah
valley of Virginia, the mosquito bogs of Jersey, the mountains and valleys of the Keystone, through savage( infested
Mass., in the Mayflower, across trackless seas, to the good
old Anglo-Saxon, Puritan family, on the banks of the Lindon, in the east of Briton. From thence cometh him of
whom we speak, gathering on the way all the best traits and
characteristics of the Puritan and Cavalier. And there he
stands, this second Moses, after landing from that little boat,
on the banks of the Sangamon, at the age of 21, in the wilderness, on the very fringe of civilization, with the stature of a
giant, the strength of a Sampson, the moral fibre of a Cromwell, and an unseared conscience of a St. Paul, made such by
the training and example of a loving, pious mother and a
godly step-mother. There he stands on the banks of that
river with less than twelve months of schooling, facing the
future without a dollar in his pocket; poverty stricken in
every-thing but a good name. He said himself that he was
so poor that his first pair of trousers were made out of buckskin, and everytime they got wet they would shrink, and
after a few wettings and shrinkings there were exposed between the tops of his socks and the bottom of his trousers
about five or six inches of shins.
This poverty was extended to his library, but this poverty was his wealth, for it consisted of the Bible, Pilgrims
Progress, Aesops Fables, Weem's Life of Washington, History of the United States and an old Volume of the Laws of
Indiana, which he found in the bottom of an old barrel of
rubbish, he bought for fifty cents from an emigrant. He read
and reread them until he had them committed to memory.
Any ten year old child can see how these wrought in the
building of his majestic character. Thus equipped, impov-

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
erished and at the same time enriched, Mr. Lincoln stepped
out in life alone, on these outskirts of civilization, to make
his own way, and acquire the training for the destiny which
should be awaiting him. And that destiny has been made
history, and the world knows what it is. The ordinary citizen and the pupils in our schools know that Abraham Lincoln
was born in poverty, came to manhood in the same condition, had but little schooling, split rails, known as "Honest
Abe," a participant in a great debate with Douglass, elected
sixteenth President of the United States, emancipated the
slaves and was assassinated by John Wilkes Booth.
But
how many know Lincoln, the lawyer? At first glance the
foregoing facts would seem to unfit rather than qualify him
for the legal profession. But the things not found generally in popular history are the things that did qualify him and
actually made Abraham Lincoln one of the most noted lawyers of the state and barring his public career would have
placed him in time as one of the leading barristers in the
nation.
Abraham Lincoln was born February 12, 1809. He was
admitted to practice law March 1, 1837 and elected President
in November of 1860. But the nomination took place on
May 18th preceding. So he was past twenty-eight years of
age when admitted to the bar, and was in the actual practice
covering a period of only a little more than twenty-three
years.
Some one has said that he was not a type of his time
but a unique figure of the period. He was in a class by
himself. He had no ancestors, no fellows, no successors.
His feeling of independent self reliance is set forth in his
own words; "I don't know who my grandfather was. I am
He
more concerned to know what his grandson will be."
must have had some natural aptitude for the law, but he inherited none, for his father was a carpenter, and his forefathers for six generations constitute a weaver, two blacksmiths, and three farmers, and as Lincoln would say, "there
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is no smell of royalty in that" neither is there any ground
work for the law.
He lived in a community of pioneers nearly all his life,
at least while he was growing to manhood and character was
being formed. It was a community where straight forwardness and honest dealing was assumed as a matter of course,
yet Lincoln won for himself early in life a reputation for integrity and honesty that clung to him through his professional life and finally saved the greatest Republic in the
world.
We only mention this because extraordinary integrity,
honor and fairness, are essential elements of a great lawyer,
and he must conduct himself so as to exemplify the noblest
aspirations of his profession. As it has been said, "Justice
is the greatest interest of man on earth; courts are instituted
for its administration, and lawyers are the handmaids of the
courts." To whom, then, do we have a better right to look
for our ideals of honorable and upright conduct, either in
public or private life, than those who resort to this forum as
advocates of what they conceive to be the rights of their
clients." Lincoln had these qualifications in full, and he
lived to extol them by precept and example. It was his
stock in trade, and it is the greatest asset any lawyer can
have. The property, real and personal of the whole world
is said to pass through the hands of lawyers, or within their
professional care, every thirty years. To no class of individuals are so great interests confided, and to no other are
such results expected. No one by education or practice or
training is so capable of caring for so great interests. None
better to fill the seats of the mighty, in legislative halls, on
the bench, and in executive office as the lawyer. By the
same token none so capable of doing harm as he, if derelect
in duty, or worse, unscrupulous in character. An ignorant
knave is bad enough but educate him and his capacity for
harm is multiplied many fold.
Lincoln regarded the law as a calling and not so much
a profession, and no one ever believed in his calling more
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thoroughly than he. He said to some law students: "let no
youig man choosing the law for a calling yield to the popular belief that to be a lawyer one cannot be honest. If, in
your judgment you cannot be an honest lawyer, resolve to
be honest without being a lawyer. Choose some other occupation rather than one in the choosing of which you do, in
advance, consent to be a knave."
The first great outstanding event which had a bearing
on this marvelous career occurred in New Orleans in the
first year of his full manhood. Mr. Lincoln with his cousin
John Hanks had made his second trip to that city on a flat
boat. Their mission accomplished, they were strolling
about the streets when they noticed a crowd.
Hastening
down to the place they witnessed the worst side of slavery
...... a public auction of these poor people. They see women and girls, stripped to the waist, men handling them as
they would cows and calves; making them run to see if they
were lame; looking in their mouths to see if their teeth were
sound; calculating their age. They hear the auctioneer tell
of their good points; how much work they can do, what
they .were fitted for, how good, kind and religious. They
hear the weeping and wailing as husbands are separated
from their wives, and children from their parents, never to
The young boatman
meet again on these mortal shores.
turns away with something rising in his throat, but a great
resolve came into his soul, and that resolve was an inspiration to all his subsequent life.
From this eventful journey Mr. Lincoln returned to
Illinois and settled in the little village of New Salem, consisting of twenty log shacks called houses. Here he engaged in the occupation of clerk in a general store, studied
grammar, biographies, and finally law. At twenty-three he
became a candidate for the legislature and was defeated. At
twenty-five he ran again and was elected. He was elected
to four successive terms.
At the end of his second term he
moved to Springfield and continued the study of law. On
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being admitted to the bar, he became a partner with Major
Stuart, one of the prominent lawyers on the circuit.
While Mr. Lincoln had no assistance in his legal career
from his ancestors by the law of heredity, he certainly was
most fortunate in contemporaries both at the bar and in the
legislative halls, and in the place he won for himself in their
estimation. Among these were such men as Douglass, Baker, Logan (afterwards his law partner) Edwards, McClernand, Stuart, Trumbull, McDougall, Browning, Hardin and
Davis.
Stephen A. Douglass was pubilc prosecutor at twentytwo, a judge at twenty-eight, U. S. Senator, and candidate
for the Presidency, one of the ablest men of his day. James
A. McDougall, became attorney general of Illinois, and U.
S. Senator from California. Lyman Trumbull became U.
S. Senator from Illinois.
David Davis was judge of the
eighth circuit and justice of U. S. Supreme Court. Edward D. Baker, Congressman from Illinois and leader of the
California bar, and U. S. Senator from Oregon.
Stephen
T. Logan was judge of the Circuit Court and one of the best
trial lawyers of the state. Browning became Senator and
Edwards became Governor of the state. Who will gainsay that such contemporaries and intimate associates were
not equivalent to the best law faculty on the continent? For
it must be remembered that the Court House was the center
of government, the meeting place of the people, and the
source of information generally.
But in the legislative halls Lincoln was associated with
a couterie of legal lights which was also an education in itself. There were in those early legislatures a future president of the United States, a future candidate for president
of the- United States, six future United States senators, eight
future congressmen, a future cabinet secretary, three future
judges of the state courts, to say nothing of many 6thers
who attained distinction at the bar. Nearly all these men
were lawyers and Lincoln was in constant contact with them
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in his professional career and early became a peer of any of
them.
Mr. Lincoln had a high regard for the dignity of his
calling, and would not barter away that dignity by doing business that did not belong to it. A would-be client wrote to
the firm requesting it to find a buyer for some land. Lincoln replied that as to handling real-estate that was out of
their line. "We attend strictly to legal business." he said,
"and recommend that you turn your real-estate business
over to a certain dealer naming him."
Not only would he turn away business not belonging to
the profession, but discouraged certain business which did
belong to it. At any rate he believed in keeping people out
of court instead of getting them in whenever it was possible
to do so. Hence he acted many times in the role of peacemaker instead of trouble maker. A client desired him to
collect $600.00 from a poor widow with six orphaned children. "Yes we can probably gain your case for you; we
can set a whole neighborhood to loggerheads; we can distress this poor widowed mother and her six children and
thereby get for you $600.00 to which you have a legal
claim, but which rightfully belongs, it appears to me, as
much to the woman as it does to you. You must remember,
however, that some things legally right, are not morally
right. We shall not take your case, but we will give you a
little advice for which we will not charge you a cent. You
seem to be a sprightly man, and energetic. 'We would advise you to try your hand at making $600.00 in some other
way.
This is the advice he gave to young attorneys: "Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can.
Point out to them how the nominal winner is often the real
loser in fees, expenses and waste of time. As a peace-maker the lawyer has a superior opportunity of becoming a
good man. There will always be enough business. Never
stir up litigation. A worse man can scarcely be found than
one who does this. A moral tone ought to be infused into
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the profession which should drive such men out of it."
Here is a bit of Lincoln philosophy which is sound and
will be helpful to the profession everywhere, if followed:
"Quarrel not at all. No man resolved to
make the most of himself can spare time for
personal contention. Still less an he afford to
take on the consequences, including the vitiating of his temper and the loss of self control.
Yield larger things which you can show no
more than equal right; and yield lesser ones,
though clearly your own.
Better give your
path to a dog than be bitten by him in contesting for the right. Even killing the dog will
not cure the bite."
The matter of fixing fees was an fever present subject
of importance. This he made a matter of conscience. The
work for which the fee is charged must be right and honest.
The subject matter of the work, or in other words, the case
must be right, the advice to the client must be honest, the
account of the client's money must be honest, and the conduct toward the court must be proper and courteous.
On one occasion in the midst of a criminal trial during
a recess, the defendant told Mr. Lincoln that he was guilty
of the charge. "Then," said Lincoln, "that being true, I
shall withdraw from the case." "No you won't," said the
client, "you will go right on and defend me." When court
reconvened Mr. Lincoln informed Judge David Davis (afterward U. S. Supreme Justice) what had transpired and
that he was withdrawing from the case. Judge Davis said,
"No, you must go on with it, as it would greatly prejudice
the defendant for you to withdraw at this time in the trial."
Judge Davis informed him that if he withdrew, he, the
Judge would appoint him as counsel and thereby he would
be in contempt of court if he did not obey." He went' on
with the case and cleared the scamp. On another occasion
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a client came in the office and stated his case. When he
was through Mr. Lincoln said: "I will have nothing to do
with your case. I could not maintain my self respect, if I
took it. There is one person with whom I must live in
peace, and that person is myself within. Maybe my partner
can take your case, but if he does, he will be alone and take
all the fee." His partner took the case and got a $1000.00
fee.
Here is some Lincolnian fee philosophy in a
brief space: "This matter of fees is important
far beyond the mere question of bread and butter involved. Properly attended to, fuller justice is done to both lawyer and client. An exorbitant fee should never be claimed.
As a
general rule, never take your whole fee in advance, nor any more than a small retainer.
When fully paid beforehand, you are more
than a common mortal if yod can feel the same
interest in the case, as if something still was in
prospect for you, as well as for your client.
And whe!n you lack interest in the case, the job
will very likel lack skill and diligence in its
performance."
Mr. Lincoln was always desirous of stripping a case of
non-essentials. In a trial he would concede this contention
and that contention until they reached a point which he
considered controlling and the contest would center upon
that. He knew that there were but one or two material facts
in any law suit which were controlling, and as Judge Duncan, of Ohio, says "Why should we contend for other things,
and why should we not be frank and narrow the trial to
facts really in dispute? This of course would require counsel
to investigate the facts and the law of the case before they
file their pleadings, which they ought to do anyway, but
generally do not." The judge goes on to say in the philo-
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sophy of Lincoln that this practice would have the effect of
avoiding a great many law suits, but when one was brought,
strip it of all non-essentials both in procedure and trial. The
procedure thus simplified, would operate in a great measure
to do away with the law's delay, and avoid many mistrials,
render justice more certain and have great influence to restore public confidence in the legal profession and the
courts.
Here is a case of Lincoln's to the point. An old farmer
by the name of Case had sold the Snow brothers two yoke
of oxen, a plow, harrow and wagon, and they gave their note
for the price. The boys refused to pay the note when due
and requested. Case brought suit. The counsel for the boys
set up the defence of infancy when the note was given. On
the trial Case produced the note and rested. The defence
placed a witness on the stand who testified that the oldest
boy was past twenty-three and the youngest past twenty-one
which evidence proved with the date of the note that they
were minors when the note was made. On cross examination Lincoln said, "Well, I guess we will admit that these
boys were minors when they made this note, but I would
like to ask this witness one question..Where are those oxen
and when did you see them last?" The answer was that
they were out on the farm of the Snow boys, as he saw them
plowing with them only the day before. "That is all," said
Lincoln. That was all the evidence offered. "Gentlemen," said
Lincoln to the jury, "these boys never would have tried to
cheat old farmer Case out of those oxen and those implements, but for the advice of counsel. It was bad advice, bad
in law, and bad in morals. The law never sanctions cheating, and a lawyer must be very smart indeed to twist it so
that it will seem to do so. The Judge will tell you what
your own sense of justice has already told you, that if these
13now boys were mean enough to play the baby act, when
they came to be men they would have taken the plow and
oxen back. They cannot go back on their contract and keep
that which the note was given for." The jury rendered their
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verdict without leaving the box in favor of the plaintiff.
The Snow boys thanked Lincoln for teaching them a valuable
lesson.
After following his profession a few years with Major
Stuart, Lincoln withdrew from the firm and formed a partnership with Stephen Logan at the latter's request. Judge
Logan was on one side or another of nearly every leading
case that went to the state supreme court. In his office
many distinguished lawyers were developed. No less than
four United States senators were developed, and three governors of states. All of this bears evidence to his powerful influence as a preceptor and to his faculty for recognizing
latent talent.
Mr. Lincoln's practice was not so much a personal one,
as it was assisting other lawyers in all parts of the state and
neighboring states. One Mr. Jones, of Chicago was contesting for some lake front land in that city. He lost in two
previous trials. He then went to Baltimore to engage Beverdy Johnson, one of the greatest lawyers in America. "Yes,
I know all about that case, I require $1000.00 retainer, Mr.
Jones." said Johnson. "I have not that much money with
me, but it is all right" said Mr. Jones. "You perhaps have
an acquaintance in this city who will loan it to you?" said MrJohnson. Mr. Jones leaves the office and in an hour returns
with the $1000.00. "Now, Mr. Jones, I will file a brief in ten
days, good morning." Mr. Jones starts to leave the office,
having never been invited to a chair, "Mr. Jones" "Yes."
"When you get back home, you go down to Springfield and
engage Abe Lincoln. For with this case and Abe Lincoln I
can lick the devil." The case was won.
An examination of the records of the Supreme Court of
Illinois shows that in the twenty-three years between 1837
and the Spring of 1860, broken as it was by one term of two
years in Congress, Mr. Lincoln was engaged in one hundred
and sevety-three cases before that court. Some of them were
of great importance. This is a record possibly unequalled in
his day. He tried many cases before the Circuit and Dis-
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trict courts of the United States and three before the United
States Supreme Court. Many of us would be thankful for
half that practice in a period twice as long. The greater proportion of this business came as a result of other lawyers retaining him in their cases. Some of them advertised him
as their associate or partner. It is also a fact that he tried
more cases from 1849 to 1860 than any other lawyer on the
eighth circuit.
In 1853 and soon after he was counsel for the Illinois
Central Railroad and the Rock Island Railroad Companies,
two of the largest corporations in the country. For the former company one of the most important cases tried by Mr.
Lincoln was known by the title of the Illinois Central Railroad Co. versus McClain County, 17 ILL 291, and involved
the right of the County to collect taxes against the company
contrary to the provisions of the Legislature exempting it
therefrom by the payment of seven per cent of its gross earnings into the state treasury. He won the case on a second
hearing before the court. The syllabus of that case reads
as follows:"It is within the constitutional power of the
Legislature to exempt property from taxation,
or to commute the general rate for a fixed
sum.
The provisions in the charter of the Illinois Central Railroad Company exempting it
from taxation, upon the payment of a certain
proportion of its earnings, are constitutional."
This case has been cited twenty three times by other
courtt as authority on such questions. The Ohio Supreme
Court decided the question the same way in 1856 under the
constitution of 1802, in the case of Mathwey vs. Golden,
Treas. 5 - OS - 361, but by a much divided court. The
constitution of 1851 and 1912 forbid such legislation. Every
thing is done under general laws.
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The above case of the Illinois Central has some unpleasant history back of it unknown to but few of the general
public. After the case was finally settled in favor of the
Company, Lincoln went to Chicago and presented his bill for
$2000. Geo. B. McClellan was Gen. Manager of the road, and
when Lincoln presented the bill, McClellan insulted him by
saying. "Why that is as much as a first class lawyer would
charge." He refused to pay it. "Alright," said Lincoln, and
turned and went out. On his way home he stopped off at
Bloomington where court was in session. During a recess
he informed the Court and the lawyers of his experience with
George B. and asked their opinion of what would be a reasonable fee. They .unaninously agreed $5000 was cheap, and
advised him to sue the company for that much, which he did,
and got it. In five years Lincoln appointed this same man,
McClellan to the head of the greatest army in the world, and
endured him with great patience for eighteen long months,
and suffered even greater insults.
It might be said by way of parenthesis, that Lincoln
made his reputation as a lawyer and conducted his big
cases before his debates with Douglass.
The first half of the nineteenth century was the period
in American legal history when precedents were made.
Courts had but few of these to guide them in their decisions
for this rapidly advancing civilization. Lincoln with Norman B. Judd had occasion to induce the court to make a precedent. It was in the great case involving the right of the
Rock Island R. R. Co. to maintain a bridge across the Mississippi River. This was resisted stubbornly by the steam boat
interests to protect what up to that time was practically a
monopoly of the transportation business by water. The
great growing West was seriously handicapped in its development by the lack of rapid transit to Chicago and the East
because of having to unload and ferry by boat then reload
again to the cars. In May 1856 a steamboat struck a pier
of this bridge and was wrecked and burned. The pier was
also destroyed. The boat company sued the R. R. company
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for the damages. This was only the first engagement of a
long and bitter struggle by the two interests for commercial
supremacy between St. Louis and Chicago in which the boat
interests finally lost out in the onward march of civilization.
The case when called in Sept. 1857 in Chicago, attracted many people from all over the West as well as the East.
The Steamboat company claimed that the Mississippi was
the great artery of commerce for the whole valley and that
the bridge was an obstruction to navigation which was paramount to any right of transportation by land. Lincoln painted a vivid word picture depicting the development of the
great boundless west beyond the river, an empire in potentiality in itself. "Must this great country .beyond the river
be hampered in its development by being refused the means
of transportation across the river? This should be a conceded, mutual right against which the steam boat company ought
not to prevail, and thereby stopping the progress of civilization in the western country." The court sustained Lincoln's
contention of the right to bridge the river so long as it did
not obstruct navigation. It must be noted also that this decision was secured before the United States Supreme Court
decided the question later on. So important was the question
to the interests of the thriving young city of Chicago, that the
whole press published Lincoln's argument.
In 1857 the celebrated case of McCormick v. Manny
came up for hearing in the United States Circuit Court sitting at Cincinnati. This is known as the "reaper case." Beverdy Johnson, of Baltimore, previously mentioned, was to represent one side. George Harding, of Philadelphia, a mechanical lawyer, and Mr. Lincoln were to represent the opposite
side. Edwin M. Stanton, of Pittsburg, was also engaged to
assist -Harding and Lincoln. The time for trial arrived.
Counsel for defendant held consultation. Mr. Harding of
course being an expert in mechanics, was the logical man to
explain the mechanism of the machines. Only two speeches
were to be given on a side. Who should make the other
speech, was the question. Stanton proposed to Lincoln that

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
he make the second speech. Out of modesty Lincoln replied,
"No, you better make it." "I will," blurted out Stanton.
Lincoln was so taken back, insulted and humiliated that he
would not remain for the trial. He expected Stanton to be
equally as courteous as himself. But Stanton failed him.
They put up in the same hotel in adjoining rooms. Stanton
was overheard to say, "Who is this long, lean, lank creature
with the dirty linen duster with sweat stains on the back
that resemble the map of the continent?" Five years later
when the country was facing the most perilous and critical
period in its history, a new Secretary of War was needed and
the insulted and humiliated man had the appointing to do,
and whom should he appoint but this same man, Stanton,
the insulter. My dear reader, could you have done that?
Lincoln did it because he was Abraham Lincoln. He did
it because he thought it would help to save the nation. And
it did.
One of the first cases of importance ever tried by Lincoln grew out of the sale of a colored girl named Nance. The
case went to the Supreme Court of Illinois and is known as
Bailey v. Cromwell, 4th Ill. 71. A note was made by Bailey
to Cromwell as the price for the girl. When the note became
due, Bailey refused to pay on the ground that Nance was not
a slave under the Constitution of the state and the ordinance
of 1787. Therefor there was no consideration for the note.
In the lower court Cromwell won. But Lincoln appealed to
the upper court. He presented a very able argument upon
the rights of a human being under the state constitutionthe
ordinance of 1787 and the law of nations. The lower court
was reversed and the note declared void. The syllabus of
the high court follows;
"Where a note, and an agreement in relation to the note, are made at the same time,
they must be taken together, and form one entire contract.
(a) Where the consideration of a promisory
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note was for the sale of a negro girl, and at the
same time of the sale it was agreed that payee
should produce the necessary papers and indenture, to prove that the girl was a slave, or
bound to service under the laws of the state of
Illinois, and such papers were not produced,
though demanded :-Held, that there was no
consideration for the note, and that it was void.
It is a presumption of law, in the state of
Illinois, that every person is free, without regard to color. (b) The sale of a free person is
illegal."
This case has been cited and followed eighteen times.
It can be used now under our probibition laws, both statutory and constitutional, in liquor cases.
Thus we see that early in his legal career the young flat
boatman espoused the cause of the oppressed. He was carrying out the "great resolve" made a few years before in the
streets of New Orleans. He followed the Gleam, spurred on
by the holy inspiration there obtained, through to the end,
and God said, "Well done thou good and faithful servant."
ELLAHUE ANSILE HARPER
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MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH v. WORTHINGTON
of a Child Five
Criminal Law-Mlurder-Evidence-Declarations
Years Old-Silence of Defendant-Res gestae-Evidence as to
Previous Offense-Act of March 15, 1911, P. L. 20
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Trial for the murder of Worthington's wife. Proof was received of the statements made to him of his son "five years old, as to
events connected with the crime, and his failure to respond or contradict them. He contends that, as the son could not have been
received as a witness, hil remarks are not admissible.
After evidence of good character by the defendant, the Commonwealth was allowed to prove his prior conviction of assault and
battery.
Gelber. for Plaintiff.
Jenkins, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Henderson, J. The first assignment of error relates to the admission of proof of certain statements made to the defendant, after the commission of the crime, as to events connected with the
crime charged, and of the defendant's failure to reply to, or contradict them. It is claimed that error was committed In admitting
this proof, because the child could not have been received as a wit'ness.
That the declaration of the child could be taken as a part of the
res gestae is most doubtful. The general rule has been laid down,
that In order to constitute a part of the res gedtae, an act or declaration must accompany, and be contemporaneous with the act of
which it alleged to be a part. 22 C. J. 252. In most cases, however, some interval of time, no matter how great or slight, elapses
between the doing of an act, and the making of a statement, so
that the two cannot be synchronous In the precise meaning of the
term. The tendency resulting from this difficulty is to substitute
spontaneity for contemporaneousness, and the act or declaration is
not required to be coincident in point of time with the main fact.
but may be separated from it by a considerable interval of time, pro-
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vided that it is so closely connected with the main fact as to be
practically inseparable from it.
22 C. J. 452.
The declarations in question are obviously not Inseparably
linked with the main fact, nor do they partake of the requisite
spontaneity under the rule mentioned. But the statements, being
made to the father within the hearing of others, would naturally
inspire a denial of them, If they were not true. The primal Instinct of self preservation prompts one to immediately deny false
accusations, lest those hearing them infer that they are true. In
Commonwealth v. Lisowski, 274 Pa. 222, the facts are similar to
those now in question, except that the statements by the child were
made three hours after the occurrence 'in the presence of an officer.
Mr. Justice Sadler In his opinion said, "The period of time Intervening from the murder, to the making of the statements, was
such as to negative the idea that they were part of the res gestae,
but the silence of the father, when so charged, Is a circumstance
to be taken Into consideration by the jury," citing Commonwealth
v. Ashton, 227 Pa. 112; Commonwealth v.- Jonson, 213 Pa. 607,
"And the incompetency of the child does not alter the situation."
The second assignment of error is that the Commonwealth
should not have been allowed to prove the prior conviction of defendant for assault and battery, after the defendant has offered evidence of his good character as a peaceful and law-abiding citizen.
The Act of March 15, 1911, P. L. 20 provides In part, "Any
person charged with any crime, and called as a witness In his own
behalf, shall not be asked, and if asked, shall not be required to
answer; any question tending to show that he has committed, or
been charged with, or been convicted of any offense, other than the
one with which he Is charged, or tending to show that he Is of
bad character or reputation."
This rule relates to cases where the defendant's character is
not in Issue, and Is intended to prohibit the Introduction of testi.
mony which, while Irrelevant to the matter then at issue, would
damage the defendant and create prejudice against his cause. But
this rule cannot be Invoked here. The defendant has already offered evidence of his good character as a peaceful and law abiding
citizen, either by testifying In his own behalf, or by calling character witnesses to establish the fact. He thereby puts his character and reputation In issue, and the Commonwealth thereby derives a resulting right to rebut and disprove his good reputation
as a peaceful citizen. What more cogent evidence along this line
could be conceived of, than his previous conviction of assault and
battery-an undeniable breach of the peace? Such testimony was
properly received.
Commonwealth v. Garanchowski, 251 Pa. 247;
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Commonwealth v. Emery, 273 'Pa. 517.
We find no virtue in either of the complaints of the defendant.

The appeal Is therefore dismissed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT

Tim defendant's son, five years old, was not offered as a witness. He was five years old,
This age however, would not have
required him to be rejected.
He might have been sufficiently developed mentally, to justify hearing him by the jury.
In his second edition of the treatise on Evidence, Vol. 1, Section 505, Wigmore says, "This much may be taken as settled, that no rule defines any particular age as conclusive of incapacity; in each instance the capacity of the particular child Is to be investigated."
Why the offer of him was not made, does not appear.
If it was
because he would not have Impressed the jury as knowing what
he said to have occurred, an indirect proof of what he said would
hardly be- Justifiable.
The defendant has not contradicted what
he said out of court, in his presence.
That a father should get into a contention with a five year old son, concerning facts, is not
to be expected.
One can hardly think that the refusal thus to testify would be explainable only by the defendant's knowledge of
the truth of the boy's allegations, and his unwillingness to contradict for that reason. However, apparently, it Is to be submitted
to the Jury to decide whether the silence wa due to the sense that
the boy's statements were true, or due to a sense of the absurdity
of entering into a dispute with a lad 5 years old, the son of the
interlocutor.
The defendant has given evidence of his good character in order to increase the difficulty of believing that he maliciously killed
his wife.
When such evidence was given, It was made competent
for the Commonwealth to rebut It, by proof of violence, and other
bad traits.
The opinion of the learned court below so well discusses the
question Involved, that further remarks by us are unnecessary.
The judgment Is AFFIRMED.

FLEMING'S ADMINISTRATOR v. ACCIDENT INSURANCE
Insurance-Accident

CO.

Insurance-iValking on Railroad Tracks-Unnessary Rxposure to Danger
STATEMENT OF FACTS

A policy of insurance was purchased by Fleming, a young man,
20 years old, for $3000.
It, by its terms, was not applicable to any
Injury or death resulting from an unnecessary exposure to danger.
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His mother becoming gravely ill, he attempted to reach a physician. To do this it was necessary to cross a railroad. The seriousness of the mother's illness induced him to cross the track, although he heard a train approaching, which however he could not
see, owing to a curve In the track. The attempt to cross reSulted
in his being struck and killed.
Defense is "unnecessary exposure."
Miss Everhart, for the plaintiff.
Bower, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Bailey, J. Whether the insurance company is liable to the
administrator of the insured depends on whether or not the insured
exposed himself unnecessarily to. danger. We must consider therefore whether crossing the track was, under all the circumstances,
an unnecessary exposure to danger.
In considering this question the law of negligence does not
govern. Such negligence on the part of the deceased as would bar
a recovery against the railroad does not necesisarily bar a recovery
under the policy of insurance. It was held in Biehl v. General Accident Ins. Co., 38 Pa. Superior 114 that the exposure must be
something beyond the ordinary, or a wanton piece of gross carelessnesg.
As the defendant is making an affirmative defense, the burden
of proof is on him to show that it was an unnecessary exposure
for the deceased to cross the track. Bowers v. The Great Eastern
Casualty Co., 260 Pa. 147.
Construing the words "unnecessary exposure to danger" most
strongly against the defendant, (Durkhard v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
102 Pa. 262; 243 Pa. 380; 264 Pa. 505), and considering the urgency of the deceased's errand, and the fact that the train was not
in sight, we believe that the defendant has not affirmatively
shown that the deceased's act came within the clause exempting
them from liability. We are not persuaded that It was a reckless
act, or that the ordinary prudent man would not, under the same
circumstanced, have acted in the same manner and exposed himself to danger.
As the acts do not affirmatively show a good defense, the defendant is liable for the amount of the policy. Judgment for the
plaintiff in the sum of $3000.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The policy was not applicable to any death resulting from an
"unnecessary exposure to danger." That Fleming exposed him-
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Death
self to danger, In crossing the railroad track is manifest.
was a near result of the act. It may alo be conceded that he wa
Was the
conscious that the act was one of exposure to danger.
The ordinary man would think It necesexposure "unnecessary?"
If
sary, when hig mother is gravely ill, to procure a physician.
a railroad track lay between his home and the doctor's, he would
The learned court below
think It necessary to cross the track.
has concluded that there was no unnecessary exposure to danThe features of Wilcox v. Cenger. We cannot think otherwise.
tral Accident Ins. Co., 234 Pa. 58, and some other cases are clearly different from those of this case.
The Judgment Is AFFIRMED.

HOLLIS v. LIFE INS. CO.
Insurance-Contract-Presumption of Death From AbsenceDomicile
STATEMENT OF PACTS
A life Insurance policy issued to Hollis stipulated that Ills
death was not to be presumed from his absence from home for any
period of time. He left his home in Philadelphia for the Canadian
Province of Alberta, and after one letter sent home, was never
heard from for nine years, when this action on the policy for
Defendant objects that there is
15000 was begun by his widow.
no valid proof of death.
OPINION OF THE COURT
there Is a well settled presumption of death after an absence of seven years from the last place
of residence and nothing having been heard from the person In
Scott, J.

In

Pennsylvania,

question during that time.
4 Wharton 150, Burr v.
3 S. & R. 490, Miller v.

Sim.
Beates.
180 Pa. 644, Francis v. Francis.
269 Pa. 139, Roblin v. The Supreme Tent of Knights of Macabees.
And under the ordinary contract of insurance where there are
no stipulationd to the contrary, death under the above facts would
be presumed and due proof of death made out as required under the
provisions of the Insurance Act of 1921.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff cites the case of 269 Pa.
re139, supra, in support of his argument that the widow should
beneficial
a.
was
It
that
however,
find,
we
case
cited
the
In
cover.
A. by-law similar to the provision of the
company as defendant.
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Insurance policy In question was passed, but at a time two years
after the Insured had disappeared.
It was aimed at him. The
court allowed a recovery on the ground that the insured did not
know of the new by-law and therefor could not assent to It.
But in this case, the insured asented to the condition regarding the presumption of death by reason of being a party to the
contract and signing it. Insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes to Indemnify another against loss, damage or liability
arising from an unknown or contingent event.
178 Pa. 636, Com. v. Provident Bicycle Assn.
137 Pa. 412, Com. v.

Equitable Ben. Assn.

And the Insured Is governed by the rules of contract.
The question then is, can a person who has a right concerning the proof of death sign away that right in an Insurance policy. If he can sign away that right by accepting a policy containing a provision derogatory to his right, there can be no recovcovery In case of presumed death. If he can't sign away such a
right in that manner, there can be a recovery.
If A makes a contract with B, in which there Is a stipulation
to the effect that the signature of B must be witnessed by two witnesses who are to attest to the signature by signing their names
to the same document and there is a controversy later on, B's
signature can only be attested to on the witness stand by the
signing witnesses.
Clark on Contracts, Page 487, 3rd Ed. 1914.
But B had a common law right to have his hand writing proven by any two witnesses familiar with his handwriting.
However, he signed away that right and 'Is bound by the contract he
entered into.
The case in hand Is analagous.
Hollis had a good right of
having his death presumed by absence of seven years, but he
chose to sign away his right by accepting the policy of the defendant company. He is presumed to know what he accepted and
is bound thereby, even though It contained a provision derogatory
to the interests o his beneficiaries.
At first impression it would seem that such a rule to prevent
recovery is a harsh one, but Hollis went into the contract with
his eyes open and assented thereto.
If It was harsh on him he
had the privilege of rejecting the offer of the Insurance Company.
The stipulation in question is one which the insurance companies
insert for their own protection against fraud. If such a condition were thrown out by the courts, it would work a great hardship on such companies, even harder than the one now worked
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Such a provision Is
on the plaintiff.
nor Is It prohibited by statute.

not against public
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The plaintiff can not recover in this case.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Hollis left Philadelphia, and went to the Province of Alberta.
That he was there, is known, from the fact that a letter was sent
thence to his home In Philadelphia. We do not know that he ever
left the place where the letter was sent. He may have establishHis absence for seven years, that would
ed his domicile there.
justify the Inference that he is dead, Is an absence from his last
Morrison's Estate,. 183 Pa. 155, Francis v. Francis, 180
domicile.
It does not distinctly appear that Hollis established a
Pa. 644.
home In Alberta, but we think that when he is shown to have been
there, there should be evidence of some sort that he has not reInquiry ought
mained there long enough to establish a domicile.
to have been made at the place from which he dent the letter, and
that It was made should appear.
Hence we think the presumption of death has not arisen.
But, even if it had, he stipulated that the policy should not
be paid except on proof, other than presumptive, that he was dead.
The defendant could make what contract it chose with the insured, to pay him should he suffer an impairment of working power,
Why It could not agree to pay the
from an accident, etc., etc.
Freedom
$5000 only on direct proof of his death, we cannot see.
We know no suffiof contract is the normal property of men.
cient reason for saying that if a contract to pay on death Is made,
There is one
a directly proven death should not be the condition.
decision, that of Gaffrey v. Royal Neighbors of America, 174 Pac.
1014, of the the Idaho supreme court to the contrary.
We think the reasons suggested by the Harvard Law Review,
January, 1919, p. 291 for questioning the soundness of the decision, convincing.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

AMVIES v. TRIPP
JudgmentsReal Property Ejectment-Binding Instructions Lien of Judgments--Bona Fide Judgment Creditors-Act of
June 4, 1901, P. L. 425-Resulting Trusts-Remedial StatutesConstruction
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tripp bought a lot for two thousand ($2,000) dollars directing
that the deed be made to it. in the name of X as grantee. While X
was thus the apparent owner, Ames received a judgment against

120

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

him. Before the sheriff's sale on this judgment, X made a declaration that he held the land in trust for Tripp, which declaration
was put on record. A sheriff's sale on the judgment then occurred, Ames becoming the purchaser.
When the judgment was recovered a tenant of Tripp was In possession, who, if asked, would
have disclosed Tripp's ownership. This Is ejectment by Ames.
Mask, for the Plaintiff.
Parsons, for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Ramey, J.
This is truly a resulting trust, the creation of
which Is a valuable asset In many respectd, and the true intention
of which may be fraudulently defeated, but the common law provides that if any person should attempt to defeat Its purpose the
trust Itself will be defeated.
That Is, where such purchase is
made In fraud of an existing statute and In evasion of its express
provisions, or where the conveyance is made to a third person In
defraud o creditors, no trust can result In favor of the party who
Is guilty of the fraud.
It was further settled at common law that where a purchaser
buys property which Is subject to a trust, If he receives notice of
the trust before paying the purchase money he is not bona fide and
Is bound to reconvey.
Furthermore, If there are circumstances
connected with the property which reasonably Indicate that trust
property Is being dealt with, they will fix upon the purchaser notice of the trust.
It was said in Reed's Appeal, 13 Pa. 475, "If anything Is settled by reason and authority It is that a judgment creditor is not
entitled to the protection of the purchaser of the legal title,
against an equitable owner, or his creditors or to any advantage
which his debtor had not".
It was also held in Still v. Swackhammer, 103 Pa. 7, to be a settled question that where property
Is conveyed by A to ,B by deeds absolute on their face, but a trust
is reserved by parol In favor of C, that a judgment creditor of B,
who afterwards buys the property at sheriff's sale, under his judgment, will be bound by express notice of C's equitable title, given
at any time before the sheriff's sale.
In the present case Ames having adequate notice of the trust
prior to the sheriff's sale and there not being the slightest intimation of fraud or the semblance thereof, Tripp could undoubtedly have recovered under the theory of the common law.
Counsel for the plaintiff contends that the law as just recited
wag a mischief and that the Act of 1901 was passed to relieve bona
fide judgment creditors from this mischief to which they had only
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been Innocently subjected.
In this respect we must consider the
Act of June 4, 1901; P. L. 425, "Whenever hereater a resulting
trust shall arise with respect to real estate, by reason of the payment of the purchase money by one person, and the taking or malting of the legal title In the name of another, if the person advanc-.
Ing the purchase money has capacity to contract, such resulting
trusts shall be void and of no effect as to bona fide judgment or
other creditors. etc., unless either (1) a declaration of trust has
been executed and acknowledged by the holder of the legal title and
recorded In the Recorder's office of the county where the land is
situated, or (2) unless an action of ejectment has been begun in the
proper county by the person advancing the money, against
the
holder of the legal title."
As counsel foi plaintiff contends, this act Is a

remedial one,

but as stated In Rochester Trust Co.
v.
White,
243 Pa. 479:
"There are three points to be considered in the construction. of
remedial statutes; the old law, the mischief, and the remedy; that
Is, how the common law stood at the making of the act; what the
mischief was for which the common law did not provide; and what
remedy the legislature has provided to cure this mischief. And It
Is the business of the judges to so construe the act as to suppress
the mischief and advance the remedy.
Since it is In our province to construe the meaning of this socalled remedial statute, we must go farther than construe the literal meaning of the act; we must consider the mischief as It existed together with the intentions of the legislature.
In reconciling
these elements we would be compelled to tax our Imagination to
include the case at hand within the meaning of the act of 1901.
In Levy v. Hershberger, 249 Pa. 504, a case cited by counsel
for plaintiff to be analagous to the case at hand, the court it is
true declared the trust void under the act of 1901, P. L. 425, and
entered judgment for the plaintiff.
But in that case there were
two Intervening circumstances which we think materially altered
the two situations.
There the trustee and the cestul que trust,
who furnished the money with which to purchase the property
bore the relationship of husband and wife respectively; there also
the trustee conveyed the property to the equitable owner after involuntary bankruptcy proceedings had
been instituted
against
him.
In applying the act of 1901 to the present case, we would work
a hardship upon the innocent cestui que trust, Tripp, while we
would be conferring unjust benefits upon the judgment creditor,
Ames.
This we cannot do If we are to look beyond the letter of
the act and see the intention of the legislature.
And.if the act
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is a remedial one and was meant to correct a mischief, we do not
think the mischief meant to be corrected lies in thid case.
"The
letter killeth but the spirit maketh alive."
Judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
When X was made the apparent owner of land, by the naming
of him as grantee in the deed, if the purchase money was furnished by A, so that a trust resulted for A, it was held, prior to the
Act of June 4th, 1901, P. L. 425, that A could assert his equity,
as against the judgment creditor of X, but not, after a sheriff's
sale, on that judgment, to one who had no notice of the trust.
The Act of 1901, was intended to give the same advantage to
the judgment creditor, so as to make possible the extinction of the
equity, by the judgment, so that if the trust had ceased to avail
against the creditor, it would not avail against any purchaser at
the dheriff's sale, however fully he knew of the former trust.
The act Is worthy of criticism in that it does not provide for
other notifications of the trust to the creditor before he obtains
judgment, than those wentioned in it.
It provides for a declaration of trust, acknowledged and recorded; or an action of ejectment.
But, in the case before us, we have a third means of notice.
A tenant of the cestui que trust id occupying the land, and
inquiry from him by the creditor would possibly have elicited information as to the ownership of the land.
Why this means of
revelation of the 'state of the ownership, was overlooked by the
legislature, it is not easy to discover.
Nevertheless, we feel no warrant to add to the modes of notice, so carefully specified by the statute.
We must conclude, then, that since none of these modes was
adopted, the trust Is not capable of assertion against the judgment
creditor.
Despite the well written opinion of the court below we are
bound by the Act of 1902 and its interpretation by Rochester
Trust Company v. White, 243 Pa. 469.
REVERSED

